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This paper gives a quantitative assessment of possible trade effects resulting from different 
trade liberalization scenarios within the EU. The simulations are based on the GTAP model, 
a computable general equilibrium model. We use the GTAP database and own estimates 
of protection in the service sector. We compare different scenarios, which differ in the 
extent of their liberalization (linear versus sector country and specific cuts in existing trade 
barriers, including all sectors versus only selected sectors). Our findings point towards 
larger gains from more comprehensive cuts (i.e. including all service sectors) and larger 




The FIW Research Reports show the results of the three thematic work packages 
‘Export of Services’, ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ and ‘Competitiveness’, that were 
commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA) 
within the framework of the ‘Research Centre International Economics” in 
November 2006. 





































Oppolzergasse 6  Telephone: (+43-1) 533 66 10  E-mail: wiiw@wiiw.ac.at 
A-1010 Vienna  Fax: (+43-1) 533 66 10-50  Website: www.wiiw.ac.at  










This paper gives a quantitative assessment of possible trade effects resulting from different 
trade  liberalization  scenarios  within  the  EU.  The  simulations  are  based  on  the  GTAP 
model,  a  computable  general  equilibrium  model.  We  use  the  GTAP  database  V7 
(pre-release,  benchmarked  to  2004)  and  own  estimates  of  protection  in  the  services 
sector. We  compare  different  scenarios  which  differ  in  the  extent  of  their  liberalization 
(linear versus sector- and country-specific cuts in existing trade barriers, full versus partial 
liberalization).  Our  findings  point  towards  larger  gains  from  more  comprehensive  cuts 
(i.e. including all services sectors) and considerably larger trade gains for the – so far more 
restricted – new EU member states. We further observe a reinforcement of specialization 
patterns, with the new members intensifying their position as Europe’s manufacturing base 
and  the  old  members  moving  out  of  manufacturing  and  specializing  increasingly  in 
services. 
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1.  Introduction 
Trade liberalization in the services sector is a topic which has been on the table for more 
than ten years now. With the inception of the WTO in 1995, trade liberalization in the 
services  sector  has  formally  become  part  of  the  multilateral  liberalization  agenda.  The 
GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) is an integral part of the WTO treaty. 
Nevertheless, the literature on trade and trade policy in services is comparably small. This 
is also due to a lack of knowledge  with respect to the definition and measurement of 
barriers to trade in services. Since services themselves are often intangible, also barriers to 
trade  in services are difficult to  define. The situation  is further complicated by the far-
reaching definition of trade in services under the GATS, which includes cross-border trade, 
movement of persons as well as sales through foreign affiliates.  
 
A  key  methodological  issue  in  measuring  services  barriers  is  to  distinguish  between 
services restrictions which are protective and those which are designed to meet legitimate 
economic or social objectives (Dee, 2005). Often the application of certain restrictions can 
be justified, for instance, when they are aimed to provide for safety (air passenger transport 
sector) or financial stability (banking sector). Different approaches can be applied here: 
(1) to decide a priori which measures can be justified and exclude them from analysis; 
(2) to treat regulation on a continuum by allowing for a non-linear relationship between 
regulation and performance, and then identify at which point the degree of regulation has 
the least adverse effect on economic performance; (3) to include all regulatory measures in 
the  analysis  and  identify  whether  they  have  an  adverse  effect  on  some  measures  of 
economic performance (even when the measures have a legitimate objective, it is useful to 
know their impact on performance – in case it turns out to be too high, regulators could 
possibly consider less burdensome measures which would reach the same objective). 
 
The restrictions to services supply can be classified in several dimensions:  
-  affecting establishment (the ability of services suppliers to establish physical outlets 
in an economy and supply services through those outlets) or ongoing operations 
(the operations of a services supplier after it has entered the market); 
-  non-discriminatory  (restricting  domestic  and  foreign  services  suppliers  alike)  or 
discriminatory (restricting only foreign services suppliers); 
-  affecting prices of services or costs of services providers.  
 
The  methodologies  of  estimating  barriers  to  trade  and  investment  in  services  can  be 
divided into two broad categories: 
-  Direct  methodology.
1  This  methodology  directly  measures  the  effects  of 
restrictions,  as  measured  by  a  trade  restrictiveness  index,  on  economic 
                                                            
1   This methodological approach is often referred to as method of the Australian Productivity Commission. 2 
performance  indicators  of  services  suppliers.  An  econometric  model  is  used  to 
estimate  the  determinants  of  economic  performance  in  that  services  sector 
(typically price, cost, price-cost margin, quantity or productivity), services supply 
restrictions being one of the factors. 
-  Indirect  methodology.  This  methodology  determines  a  benchmark  price  for  a 
service and attributes part or all of a price above the benchmark price to the effect 
of  restrictions.  While  applying  this  methodology  it  is  important  to  distinguish 
between  restrictions  and  other  factors  which  may  move  prices  above  the 
benchmark, such as market size, market structure etc. 
 
Many studies confirm that the main positive effects of trade liberalization in services are to 
be expected through increased efficiency and competitiveness of the domestic economy 
rather than through increases in exports (Nielson and Taglioni, 2003). Also Mattoo et al. 
(2006) find a growth-enhancing effect from openness to trade in services in the long run. 
Robinson  et  al.  (2002)  also  stress  the  indirect  effects  from  services  sector  trade 
liberalization on the efficiency and output of other sectors in the economy working through 
inter-industry input-output relations induced by imports of high-quality services. The few 
papers that attempt to assess the overall welfare effects of the current WTO Round of 
trade liberalization (the so-called Doha Round) often ascribe the largest welfare gains to 
services trade liberalization. For instance, Dee and Hanslow (2001) estimate a total effect 
of USD 260 billion from full liberalization, with USD 130 billion estimated to come from 
liberalization in the services sector (USD 50 and 80 billion arise from liberalizing trade in 
agricultural goods and manufactured goods respectively). Also Francois et al. (2005) note 
that services trade liberalization is likely to augment the gains from the Doha Round.  
 
In this paper we restrict our attention to trade effects rather than welfare effects
2. The 
analysis  of  the  trade-creating  and  trade-diverting  effects  within  Europe  provides  an 
interesting  picture  of  underlying  re-allocations  of  production  as  a  consequence  of  the 
dismantling of barriers in the internal market for services. Austria is at the focus of our 
attention, but we also compare Austria’s results with those of its major trading partners in 
the EU, other EU members, and the rest of the world, which does not liberalize services 
trade in our simulations. 
 
 
                                                            
2   Output and welfare effects for Austria, with a regional perspective, are studied in a related paper by the Austrian 
Institute  of  Economic  Research  (WIFO),  commissioned  within  the  same  project  (FIW  Arbeitspaket  No. 1, 
Dienstleistungsexport). 3 
2.  Model and data description 
2.1. GTAP model 
We  use  a  multi-region  general  equilibrium  model  to  estimate  possible  trade  effects  of 
different scenarios of cross-border services trade liberalization within the EU. The model is 
similar in structure to the one used by Francois et al. (2005). The data structure of the 
model follows the basic social accounting structure of GTAP (based on GTAPv7 data, 
benchmarked  to  2004),  while  the  theoretical  structure  has  been  modified  to  include 
investment  effects  and  imperfect  competition  (Francois  and  McDonald,  1996;  Francois 
1998). It is formulated and solved using GEMPACK, a software package designed for 
solving non-linear general equilibrium models. 
 
The model distinguishes five factors of production: land, natural resources, capital, skilled 
and unskilled labour, with the three latter factors considered to be perfectly mobile across 
sectors.  Labour  is  immobile  across  international  borders,  while  net  capital  flows  are 
controlled  by  the  macroeconomic  closure  of  the  model.  While  the  net  capital  account 
balance in any general equilibrium model depends, in aggregate, on the macroeconomic 
features of the model, gross re-allocations of capital through FDI inflows and outflows are 
possible (though not explicitly tracked). In other words, the model is consistent with gross 
changes  in  FDI  inflows  and  outflows  linked  proportionally  to  changes  in  cross-border 
trade,
3 even while it imposes a macro balance constraint on total net capital inflows. This 
net balance constraint is driven by macroeconomic and financial aspects of the model and 
not the by the sector results in services. Re-allocations of labour across sectors can be 
accounted for through changes in wages. The model further allows selecting whether a 
sector is characterized by monopolistic or perfect competition (Francois, 1998). 
 
Trade liberalization is implemented in the model as an efficiency-enhancing reform, i.e. it 
has the same effect as technological progress in the respective sector. Thus, it reduces the 
costs of delivering a service. Short-run (SR) effects differ from the long-run (LR) ones in the 
following  way:  The  former  report  only  static  effects,  while  in  the  long  run  prospective 
savings (and capital accumulation) become endogenous, which yields induced dynamic 
gains in addition to the purely static ones (see Francois and McDonald, 1996). 
 
 
2.2. Regions and sectors 
We  distinguish  the  following  regions  in  our  model:  the  UK,  Germany,  France,  the 
Netherlands, Italy and Austria (these five EU members are the largest services traders in 
                                                            
3   Thus, we are implicitly assuming here a complementary relationship between different modes of services supply, i.e. 
across borders and indirectly through foreign affiliates. This is consistent with recent empirical findings for the services 
sector, for instance by Fillat et al. (2008), Buch and Lipponer (2007), Moshirian et al. (2005) and Bos and van de Laar 
(2004). 4 
the EU and all of them feature prominently among Austria’s trading partners in cross-
border services trade); the rest of the EU15 (REU15); the EU12 (the new EU members); 
Switzerland, Japan, Canada and the USA (these four countries have significant shares in 

























Source data: TSD4 
 
 
We  aggregate  12  sectors  (out  of  57  possible  GTAP  sectors).  Apart  from  primary 
production, utilities,  and  other services (comprising among others mainly  personal and 
public services) we consider all sectors to be subject to monopolistic competition (for the 
sector description see Table 1).  
 
                                                            
4   TSD  –  Trade  in  Services  Database,  which  has  been  established  by  wiiw  in  collaboration  with  CEPII  and  Trade 
Partnership Worldwide, LLC supported by funding through BMWA: FIW Arbeitspaket No. 1 Dienstleistungsexport and 
the World  Bank.  Data  on  cross border  trade  and  on  FDI  in  services  has  been  assembled  from  various  sources 
(Eurostat ITS, IMF BOP and OECD IDI) to give the greatest possible coverage of countries, years, sectors and modes. 
More information about the database can be found in Pindyuk and Woerz (2008). 5 
Table 1 
Description of the sectors modelled 





Scale elasticities  Elasticity of 
substitution  
in value added 
Sector type
1) 
Primary production  PRI  8.900  0.000  0.200  PC 
Processed foods  PRF  5.000  0.000  1.100  MC 
Manufacturing  MFG  7.200  0.161  1.200  MC 
Utilities  UTI  5.600  0.000  1.300  PC 
Construction  CNS  7.200  0.161  1.400  MC 
Trade  TRD  7.200  0.161  1.700  MC 
Transport  TSP  7.200  0.161  1.700  MC 
Communication  CMN  7.200  0.161  1.300  MC 
Financial services nec  FIN  7.200  0.161  1.300  MC 
Insurance  INS  7.200  0.161  1.300  MC 
Business services nec  BUS  7.200  0.161  1.300  MC 
Other services  OSR  7.200  0.000  1.300  PC 
1) PC = perfect competition, MC = monopolistic competition. 
 
 
2.3. Barriers to cross-border services trade 
Up to date, no official estimates of barriers to trade in services for a large range of countries 
and sectors are available. Also, existing studies show rather large variations with respect to 
the methodology used, in their sector, country and time coverage and consequently in their 
results. Most studies focus on a limited number of sectors or countries. As inputs into our 
estimations we needed a comprehensive treatment of many sectors and countries in order 
to  obtain  comparable  results  across  all  sectors  and  countries.  We  therefore  used  the 
estimates by Francois et al. (2007), which are based on a residual approach, working with a 
gravity  model  of  world-wide  trade flows  in  services. The  authors justify  the  use  of  this 
indirect,  residual-based  methodology  by  the  fact  that  for  the  majority  of  countries 
comprehensive information on prevailing services policies is not available. Estimations are 
done separately for each services sector based on a pooled sample of 178 countries over 
the period 1994-2004.
5 This study covers all services sectors listed in Table 1 above, apart 
from trade and repair and the remainder category of ‘other services’ and yields average 
price variation equivalents of services sector protection. For the sectors not covered by 
Francois et al. (2007) – utilities, trade and other services – we assumed that barriers to 
                                                            
5   The estimation of protection in each services sector is done via a two-step procedure: in the first stage the authors 
regress services imports on the gravity variables (GDP per capita, population, and distance). In the second stage the 
residuals from the first stage are regressed on individual country dummies. The second stage gives an indication of 
how protected individual markets are. The resulting coefficients are used to estimate trade costs as a percentage of 
delivered prices. 6 





Barriers to cross-border services trade (trade costs as a percentage of delivered price), % 
  UTI  CNS  TRD  TSP  CMN  FIN  INS  BUS  OSR 
AUT  26.8  53.3  26.8  40.0  69.4  31.8  39.3  14.8  26.8 
DEU  12.3  48.8  12.3  22.3  53.8  19.6  2.7  6.2  12.3 
FRA  19.7  48.8  19.7  24.6  85.4  19.6  29.5  6.2  19.7 
GBR  16.3  65.5  16.3  23.1  58.9  10.2  18.2  13.0  16.3 
ITA  17.8  48.8  17.8  25.7  0.0  31.6  25.3  6.2  17.8 
NLD  24.5  59.7  24.5  30.0  58.9  19.6  16.4  6.2  24.5 
REU15  31.4  56.3  31.4  38.5  65.2  35.9  35.6  27.4  31.4 
EU12  43.1  61.0  43.1  47.1  74.7  45.6  46.2  42.3  43.1 
CHE  35.3  -  35.3  38.9  64.6  34.8  -  36.3  35.3 
JPN  15.0  48.8  15.0  20.6  85.5  19.6  14.5  6.2  15.0 
CAN  23.5  65.7  23.5  31.3  58.9  19.6  22.7  18.3  23.5 
USA  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
ROW  31.6  43.7  31.6  35.0  75.7  46.0  46.8  35.1  31.6 
Source data: Francois et al. (2007). 
 
According to Francois et al. (2007) the highest barriers to services trade within the EU are 
observed  for  the  new  member  states.  Inside  the  old  members,  Finland  and  Portugal 
emerge  as  being  most  highly  protected.  Austria  also  shows  relatively  high  rates  of 
protection as compared to its biggest trading partners. By sectors, communication services 
represent the most protected sector, followed by the construction sector. The estimates of 
barriers to cross-border services trade are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
3.  Cross-border services trade liberalization scenarios 
The EU Directive on Services in the Internal Market does not, again due to a lack of clear 
definitions and measurement of barriers to trade in services, provide quantitative estimates 
on  the  scope  and  scale  of  liberalization  across  services  sectors,  thus  we  constructed 
different  liberalization  scenarios  based  on  economically  meaningful  considerations.  In 
order  to  be  able  to  assess  the  sensitivity  of  trade  flows  to  changes  in  the  legal  and 
regulatory environment (representing explicit or implicit barriers to trade), we estimated the 
effect of a homogenous 25% reduction in services trade barriers across all services sectors 
in the EU. We then implemented the same shock with a 50% liberalization of services 
                                                            
6   The GTAP database does not distinguish travel services – which account for nearly one-quarter of global trade in 
services – as a separate sector. Travel services are subsumed in several other sectors in the GTAP database, such as 
transport, trade and repair, and other services. Since we have no information about the proportion of travel services in 
each of these categories, we simply had to assume that the econometrically derived estimates of protection in the 
respective sector net of travel services were appropriate inputs into the simulation model.  7 
trade  by  the  EU  members  to  see  how  strongly  trade  flows  react  to  this  deeper 
liberalization. In both cases, we deemed it realistic to assume that liberalization will take 
place only among EU members and not vis-à-vis third countries.  
 
However, an even more realistic scenario is one in which EU members do not liberalize 
services uniformly, but rather proportionate to their current level of protection in order to 
harmonize their regulation of services supply. In this scenario, countries which have higher 
initial barriers to services trade will reduce them at a higher rate, while those countries, 
which are relatively liberal already, will have to decrease their barriers only slightly.  
 
In order to estimate to what extent each country will liberalize its services trade, we used 
the OECD product market regulation indicators taken from Conway and Nicoletti (2006) 
and Conway et al. (2005). Indicators of product market regulation (PMR) measure the 
degree to which policies inhibit competition (both domestically and in foreign trade and 
investment). The indicators are constructed from the perspective of regulations that have 
the potential to reduce the intensity of competition in areas of the product market where 
technology  and  market  conditions  make  competition  viable.
7  Where  available  we  use 
indicators  for  specific  services  sectors  (i.e.  PMR  in  the  non-manufacturing  sectors): 
transport (an average of indicators for airlines, railway and road transport sectors), utilities 
(an  average  of  indicators  for  gas  and  electricity  supply  sectors),  communications  (an 
average of indicators for telecom and post sectors), and business services (proxied for by 
an indicator for professional services). For other sectors we used general, economy-wide 
PMR indicators. 
 
To construct the liberalization scenarios we assumed the following: for each sector the 
respective EU member which has the highest barriers to competition as measured by PMR 
indicators decreases its barriers to services trade by 50%; all other countries decrease 
their barriers to services trade by 50%*[PMRij/PMRhj], where i denotes a country, j denotes 
a services sector, and h stands for a country with the highest barriers to competition as 
measured by PMR indicators. The resulting ratios are shown in Table 3. The following 
example should explain how these figures have to be interpreted: For instance, Italy, being 
the most restricted country in other business services according the PMR indicators, would 
liberalize this sector by 50% (= 1*50%). On the other hand, the United Kingdom, which 
appears to be very liberal in most sectors, but especially in utilities, would reduce barriers 
in this sector by 8.5% (= 0.17*50%).  
 
                                                            
7   PMR indicators are constructed as a weighted average of a wide range of formal rules and regulations measures which 
are obtained as answers of OECD member governments to a standardized questionnaire.  8 
Table 3 
Product market regulation ratios (PMRij/PMRhj) 
   UTI  CNS  TRD  TSP  CMN  FIN  INS  BUS  OSR 
Country with the 
highest PMR  Poland  Poland  Poland  Greece  Hungary  Poland  Poland  Italy  Poland 
AUT  0.43  0.50  0.50  0.69  0.66  0.50  0.50  0.54  0.50 
DEU  0.35  0.52  0.52  0.42  0.55  0.52  0.52  0.87  0.52 
FRA  0.80  0.62  0.62  0.73  0.72  0.62  0.62  0.54  0.62 
GBR  0.17  0.33  0.33  0.19  0.49  0.33  0.33  0.29  0.33 
ITA  0.36  0.68  0.68  0.84  0.65  0.68  0.68  1.00  0.68 
NLD  0.37  0.50  0.50  0.36  0.48  0.50  0.50  0.44  0.50 
REU15  0.58  0.50  0.50  0.59  0.62  0.50  0.50  0.52  0.50 
EU12  0.80  0.72  0.72  0.76  0.94  0.72  0.72  0.73  0.72 
Source data: OECD, authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 4 
Services trade barriers reduction in scenario OECD1, p.p. 
  UTI  CNS  TRD  TSP  CMN  FIN  INS  BUS  OSR 
AUT  5.76  13.33  6.69  13.81  22.91  7.94  9.83  3.99  6.69 
DEU  2.14  12.68  3.19  4.68  14.80  5.10  0.70  2.69  3.19 
FRA  7.89  15.12  6.11  8.98  30.73  6.08  9.14  1.67  6.11 
GBR  1.39  10.81  2.70  2.20  14.43  1.69  3.00  1.89  2.70 
ITA  3.21  16.59  6.06  10.80  0.00  10.75  8.60  3.09  6.06 
NLD  4.53  14.93  6.12  5.40  14.14  4.91  4.09  1.36  6.12 
REU15  9.11  14.07  7.85  11.37  20.21  8.98  8.91  7.13  7.85 
EU12  17.26  21.97  15.53  17.88  35.10  16.41  16.64  15.42  15.53 
Source data: Francois et al. (2007), authors’ calculations. 
 
The outcome of this proportionate trade barrier reduction based on the suggested method 
is  presented  in  Table 4.  We  estimate  two  scenarios  based  on  these  data:  in  the  first 
scenario (OECD1) we assume that liberalization takes place in all services sectors; in the 
second, more realistic, scenario (OECD2) we assume that liberalization takes place in all 
sectors except for the most sensitive ones – utilities and other services (which include 
among  others  government  procurement  services,  personal,  cultural  and  recreational 
services). The services trade barriers resulting from scenario OECD1 are presented in 
Table 5. Scenario OECD2 then assumes the same reductions in all sectors, except for 
utilities (UTI) and other services (OSR) where no change is assumed.  
 9 
Table 5 
Services trade barriers resulting from scenario OECD1  
(trade costs as a percentage of delivered price), % 
  UTI  CNS  TRD  TSP  CMN  FIN  INS  BUS  OSR 
AUT  21.0  40.0  20.1  26.2  46.5  23.8  29.5  10.8  20.1 
DEU  10.1  36.1  9.1  17.6  39.0  14.5  2.0  3.5  9.1 
FRA  11.8  33.7  13.6  15.6  54.6  13.5  20.4  4.5  13.6 
GBR  14.9  54.7  13.6  20.9  44.5  8.5  15.2  11.1  13.6 
ITA  14.6  32.2  11.8  14.9  0.0  20.9  16.7  3.1  11.8 
NLD  20.0  44.8  18.4  24.6  44.8  14.7  12.3  4.8  18.4 
REU15  22.3  42.2  23.6  27.2  45.0  27.0  26.7  20.3  23.6 
EU12  25.9  39.1  27.6  29.2  39.6  29.2  29.6  26.8  27.6 
CHE  35.3  -  35.3  38.9  64.6  34.8  -  36.3  35.3 
JPN  15.0  48.8  15.0  20.6  85.5  19.6  14.5  6.2  15.0 
CAN  23.5  65.7  23.5  31.3  58.9  19.6  22.7  18.3  23.5 
USA  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
ROW  31.6  43.7  31.6  35.0  75.7  46.0  46.8  35.1  31.6 
Source data: Francois et al. (2007), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
4.  Results 
The simulation results of these different shock scenarios are presented in Tables 6 to 11. 
As a word of caution, we wish to stress that the results are comparative-static, showing 
only the trade impact on the economy of the defined scenario of trade liberalization in 
services.  Since  our  simulations  do  not  take  into  account  any  other  factors  but  trade 
liberalization, our results must not be seen as forecasts of the actual state after trade 
liberalization  has  taken  place  in  Europe,  but  as  the  ceteris  paribus  outcome  of  the 
decrease in services sector protection. In presenting our results, we distinguish between 
short-run effects (SR), which include only static gains and losses from trade liberalization, 
and  long-run effects (LR),  which include the dynamic  effects arising from savings and 
capital accumulation.  
 
4.1. European-wide effects 
As may be expected, services trade liberalization in the EU first of all results  in trade 
creation. Depending on the scenario, the resulting increase in world services exports is 
between 1.27% (25% and OECD2 scenario) and 3% (50% scenario) in the short run and 
marginally  larger  in  the  long  run  (1.48%  in  the  25%  scenario  and  3.53%  in  the  50% 
scenario). Thus, deeper liberalization implies a roughly proportionate increase in exports 
and imports. The 50% scenario yields on average more than twice as much increase in 
exports and imports in the EU members than the 25% scenario. In the long run, as the 
reallocation of factors of production takes place and resources are used more efficiently in 10 
sectors with higher productivity, changes in exports and imports are predictably higher than 
in the short run, with exports speeding up faster on average than imports. 
 
Table 6 
Changes in exports value resulting from 4 shock scenarios, % 
Scenarios  25%-SR  25%-LR  50%-SR  50%-LR  OECD1-SR  OECD1-LR  OECD2-SR  OECD2-LR 
AUT  4.0  4.9  8.1  10.3  4.3  5.3  3.8  4.8 
DEU  1.6  2.1  3.2  4.4  1.8  2.4  1.6  2.1 
FRA  2.8  3.1  5.6  6.3  3.6  3.9  3.0  3.3 
GBR  4.4  4.7  9.1  9.6  4.1  4.3  3.7  3.9 
ITA  2.5  2.9  5.0  6.0  3.5  4.2  3.1  3.8 
NLD  2.9  3.8  5.8  7.7  2.9  3.8  2.5  3.3 
REU15  4.6  5.1  9.2  10.6  4.9  5.6  4.3  4.9 
EU12  5.0  5.5  10.7  12.0  8.1  9.0  6.9  7.6 
CHE  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2 
JPN  0.0  -0.1  0.1  -0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.1 
CAN  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
USA  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.2 
ROW  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Note: In scenario ‘25%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 25%; in 
scenario ‘50%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 50%; in scenario 
‘OECD1’ trade barriers to services trade are cut in all services sectors by each EU member proportionate to its product market 
regulation index as measured by the OECD; scenario ‘OECD2’ assumes equal cuts as ‘OECD1’ except that sensitive sectors 
(UTI and OSR) are not liberalized; SR denotes the short run, LR the long run. 
 
Trade creation is largest among the EU member states themselves. We observe increases 
in both exports and imports
8 for all EU members, while the EU trading partners – who do 
not liberalize –  experience declines in their trade flows as they  lose their comparative 
advantages with now less protected countries. Thus, we observe both, trade creation and 
trade diversion. Trade creation is greater in initially more protected sectors; this refers to 
both exports and imports. Among the EU members it is the EU12 which experience the 
biggest  boost  in  exports  and  imports  in  all  scenarios  (except  for  imports  in  the  25% 
scenario). One possible reason is that these countries are more protective with respect to 
services trade at the outset. Austria has the highest exports and imports growth rates as 
compared  to  the  major  EU  countries  in  all  scenarios  (apart  from  the  25%  and  50% 
SR results  where  it lags  behind the UK). This reflects the fact that – according to the 
estimates used here – the country has relatively high barriers to cross-border services 
trade compared to these countries in all sectors but communications and construction. 
 
                                                            
8   We analyse here changes in exports and imports inclusive of price changes; i.e. we are looking at value and not 
volume changes. 11 
Table 7 
Changes in imports value resulting from 4 shock scenarios, % 
Scenarios  25%-SR  25%-LR  50%-SR  50%-LR  OECD1-SR  OECD1-LR  OECD2-SR  OECD2-LR 
AUT  4.6  4.9  9.5  10.4  5.0  5.4  4.5  4.8 
DEU  2.3  2.4  4.6  5.0  2.5  2.7  2.2  2.4 
FRA  2.9  3.1  5.8  6.3  3.7  4.0  3.1  3.4 
GBR  3.9  3.9  8.0  8.0  3.7  3.6  3.4  3.3 
ITA  2.6  2.9  5.3  6.1  3.7  4.2  3.3  3.8 
NLD  3.5  4.1  7.1  8.3  3.5  4.1  3.0  3.6 
REU15  4.9  5.2  10.0  10.8  5.3  5.7  4.7  5.0 
EU12  4.7  5.1  10.0  11.0  7.7  8.3  6.4  7.0 
CHE  -0.3  -0.2  -0.6  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2 
JPN  -0.3  -0.1  -0.7  -0.2  -0.4  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1 
CAN  -0.2  -0.1  -0.5  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.1 
USA  -0.4  -0.2  -0.7  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2  -0.4  -0.2 
ROW  -0.2  -0.1  -0.5  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1 
Note: In scenario ‘25%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 25%; in 
scenario ‘50%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 50%; in scenario 
‘OECD1’ trade barriers to services trade are cut in all services sectors by each EU member proportionate to its product market 
regulation index as measured by the OECD; scenario ‘OECD2’ assumes equal cuts as ‘OECD1’ except that sensitive sectors 
(UTI and OSR) are not liberalized; SR denotes the short run, LR the long run. 
 
Exports grow at a slower pace than imports in all scenarios and in all liberalizing countries 
apart  from  the  UK  and  the  EU12.  As  a  consequence,  trade  balances  sometimes 
deteriorate  for  liberalizing  countries  in  individual  services  sectors.  However,  we  also 
observe a general deterioration in the aggregate trade balance for almost all EU countries. 
This points towards a pronounced structural shift within Europe, which is revealed only by 
the  general  equilibrium  framework  and  could  not  have  been  identified  in  a  partial 
equilibrium model. We observe a clear differentiation in specialization patterns between old 
and new EU members. The old members increasingly specialize in the production and 
trade of services, while the production of manufactures is moving to the new members. 
Thus, the latter countries strengthen their position as Europe’s manufacturing base. By  
contrast,  the  selected  old  EU  members,  including  Austria,  either  reinforce  or  start  to 
develop a comparative advantage in services. Since manufacturing trade is nevertheless 
still much more important quantitatively, the gain in net services exports is substantially 
smaller in absolute value than the decline in net manufacturing exports, resulting in an 
overall  deterioration of the trade balance. The rest of the EU15 differ from the former 
countries. Here, declining net exports in services account for most of the negative change 
in  the  trade  balance.  The  EU12  stand  out  within  the  EU  as  the  countries  which  after 
liberalization noticeably increase their manufacturing exports (and decrease manufacturing 
imports). Despite a substantially improving goods trade balance, net manufacturing exports 
for the region as a whole remain negative. Further, growth in services imports considerably 
outperforms growth in services exports, leading to a widening deficit in this sector. 12 
In the long run, the negative changes of EU members’ trade balances tend to diminish, as 
the decline in manufacturing exports (and also in primary production and processed foods) 
becomes less profound, and growth of services exports speeds up. Hence, the situation 
improves again, relatively speaking, leading to an absolute improvement in the aggregate 
trade balance in countries such as Germany and Italy. 
 
Table 8 
Changes in trade balances resulting from 4 shock scenarios, USD million 
Scenarios  25%-SR  25%-LR  50%-SR  50%-LR  OECD1-SR  OECD1-LR  OECD2-SR  OECD2-LR 
AUT  -2378  -1645  -5804  -4168  -2905  -2036  -2926  -2093 
DEU  -586  702  -2480  698  -1412  -524  -2077  -1002 
FRA  -4493  -3992  -11176  -10048  -5953  -5336  -3070  -2615 
GBR  -3634  -2832  -8119  -6618  -3464  -2241  -4131  -2861 
ITA  -208  206  -104  865  77  887  -3  867 
NLD  -2209  -1443  -5607  -3664  -2364  -1641  -2330  -1789 
REU15  -16167  -13038  -38190  -30881  -18211  -14760  -17244  -13979 
EU12  -2092  -1483  -5582  -3911  -2718  -1806  -875  -498 
CHE  338  49  774  82  381  79  331  66 
JPN  3062  669  7403  1611  3515  779  3248  789 
CAN  376  38  906  84  424  54  391  61 
USA  3652  326  8767  747  4216  415  3912  453 
ROW  6042  1214  14178  2395  6714  1102  6317  1461 
Note: In scenario ‘25%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 25%; in 
scenario ‘50%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 50%; in scenario 
‘OECD1’ trade barriers to services trade are cut in all services sectors by each EU member proportionate to its product market 
regulation index as measured by the OECD; scenario ‘OECD2’ assumes equal cuts as ‘OECD1’ except that sensitive sectors 
(UTI and OSR) are not liberalized; SR denotes the short run, LR the long run. 
 
As a general remark, these mostly negative net trade effects are one aspect of trade 
liberalization. Welfare effects may turn out to be quite different, since the trade effects 
calculated here do not take full account of all effects arising from trade in services. As is 
often  mentioned  in  the  literature  (Nielson  and  Taglioni,  2003;  Robinson  et  al.,  2002), 
backward and forward linkages imply an important positive role for services imports as 
efficiency-enhancing inputs in other sectors.  
 
It is worth noting that the trade deficit in some countries (Austria, Germany, the UK, Italy 
and the Netherlands) obtained from the OECD2 scenario is higher than that from scenario 
OECD1.  This  indicates  that  a  limited  scope  of  liberalization  (i.e.  partial  liberalization, 
excluding some sectors) can inhibit its positive effects on trade. In other words, exports 
grow at a slower rate as compared to a full liberalization scenario.  
 
 13 
4.2. Trade effects for Austria 
Looking  more  closely  at  Austria’s  case,  one  can  make  the  following  observations, 
summarized in Tables 9 to 11:  
-  In the long run, the decline in manufacturing net exports is smaller than in the short 
run in all scenarios, as these sectors can benefit from cheaper services used as 
their inputs. 
-  Financial services and insurance services will experience a strong impetus from 
trade liberalization.  
-  Exports  increase  fastest  in  communications  and  construction  (between  roughly 
60%  in  the  25%  scenario  and  as  much  as  150%  in  the  50%  scenario);  these 
sectors are the most protected in the EU. In both cases, these high numbers are 
partially a result of low initial levels.
9 Nevertheless, we can expect strong dynamics 
in these sectors as a result of trade liberalization.  
-  Imports of construction services, where the trade changes are most profound, grow 
very fast as well, indicating increased intra-industry trade. Also other business and 
trade and repair services experience stronger import growth. 
-  Exports  grow  faster  than  imports  in  all  scenarios  in  the  following  sectors: 
communications  and  insurance,  financial  services,  transport,  and  utilities  (apart 
from the OECD2 scenario). Only in few of these sectors has Austria a comparative 
advantage  at  the  moment.  Financial  services,  when  taking  into  account  trade 
through foreign establishment, is one exception: here Austria is likely to increase its 
comparative advantage – especially with respect to the new member states – in a 
more  liberalized  environment.  In  transport  services,  Austria  may  build  up 
comparative  advantages  through  liberalization,  benefiting  from  its  geographic 
location within Europe, likewise in the remaining sectors.  
-  In  scenario  OECD2,  the  exclusion  of  utilities  and  other  services  from  the 
liberalization reform results in a decrease of exports of these sectors. At the same 
time their imports increase, albeit at a slower rate than in other scenarios. Although 
in this partial liberalization scenario the deterioration of the manufacturing trade 
balance  is  smaller  than  in  the  full  liberalization  scenario  (OECD1),  the  overall 
decline of the trade balance is larger due to negative trends in trade balances of 
non-liberalized sectors (utilities and other services). 
-  Negative changes in the country’s overall trade balance are generated primarily by 
a  decline  in  manufacturing  net  exports.  Processed  foods,  as  well  as  primary 
production, construction, trade and repair, business and other services in some 
scenarios also contribute negatively to the change in the trade balance.  
 
                                                            
9   With 0.7% and 0.9% respectively of total trade, or 3% and 2% respectively of trade in services, these categories are 
under-represented in Austria’s trade structure. 14 
Table 9 
Changes in Austria's exports value resulting from 4 shock scenarios, % 
Scenarios  25%-SR  25%-LR  50%-SR  50%-LR  OECD1-SR  OECD1-LR  OECD2-SR  OECD2-LR 
Primary production  -0.4  -0.5  -0.9  -1.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Processed foods  -1.0  -0.9  -2.5  -2.3  -1.2  -1.1  -1.2  -1.0 
Manufacturing  -3.2  -2.6  -7.8  -6.6  -4.1  -3.4  -3.9  -3.3 
Utilities  18.9  19.1  40.7  41.2  21.2  21.6  -1.9  -1.7 
Construction  55.0  54.6  152.1  150.0  62.8  62.3  63.0  62.4 
Trade  16.6  17.6  37.1  39.5  18.1  19.2  18.3  19.3 
Transport  19.8  20.4  49.4  51.1  22.7  23.4  21.9  22.5 
Communications  57.4  58.4  144.9  148.1  81.6  83.0  81.9  83.3 
Financial services  34.5  37.6  80.4  90.4  36.5  40.1  36.7  40.1 
Insurance  35.8  39.2  96.1  108.7  38.2  42.0  38.4  42.1 
Business services  8.0  10.4  15.9  22.0  9.5  12.2  9.6  12.2 




Changes in Austria's imports value resulting from 4 shock scenarios, % 
Scenarios  25%-SR  25%-LR  50%-SR  50%-LR  OECD1-SR  OECD1-LR  OECD2-SR  OECD2-LR 
Primary production  -1.0  0.2  -2.6  0.0  -1.5  -0.2  -1.4  -0.2 
Processed foods  1.0  1.9  2.5  4.6  1.2  2.2  1.2  2.0 
Manufacturing  0.9  1.4  2.2  3.4  1.1  1.6  1.0  1.5 
Utilities  17.3  18.6  37.5  40.9  15.4  16.7  1.3  2.4 
Construction  60.8  62.6  164.5  172.2  61.1  63.1  60.8  62.7 
Trade  17.3  17.5  38.0  38.9  17.0  17.2  16.9  17.1 
Transport  12.0  12.5  28.2  29.6  16.0  16.6  16.1  16.6 
Communications  7.3  8.1  23.7  25.7  10.5  11.3  10.5  11.3 
Financial services  2.6  3.1  6.0  7.4  2.6  3.2  2.6  3.2 
Insurance  7.1  8.5  19.7  24.1  7.7  9.3  7.7  9.3 
Business services  11.4  10.7  25.9  24.5  12.3  11.6  12.1  11.4 
Other services  17.0  16.9  41.1  40.8  17.6  17.4  5.7  5.5 
Note: In scenario ‘25%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 25%; in 
scenario ‘50%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 50%; in scenario 
‘OECD1’ trade barriers to services trade are cut in all services sectors by each EU member proportionate to its product market 
regulation index as measured by the OECD; scenario ‘OECD2’ assumes equal cuts as ‘OECD1’ except that sensitive sectors 
(UTI and OSR) are not liberalized; SR denotes the short run, LR the long run. 
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Table 11 
Changes in Austria's trade balance by sectors resulting from 4 shock scenarios,  
USD million 
Scenarios  25%-SR  25%-LR  50%-SR  50%-LR  OECD1-SR  OECD1-LR  OECD2-SR  OECD2-LR 
Primary production  7  -7  20  -9  16  3  15  2 
Processed foods  -118  -167  -297  -419  -144  -195  -137  -183 
Manufacturing  -3569  -3495  -8733  -8708  -4522  -4403  -4312  -4184 
Utilities  16  5  32  3  58  48  -31  -40 
Construction  -70  -98  -151  -269  21  -10  27  -3 
Trade  -26  6  -39  24  47  80  58  90 
Transport  827  841  2261  2297  711  727  614  629 
Communications  444  447  1075  1085  630  635  634  639 
Financial services  262  284  610  681  278  303  280  303 
Insurance  672  718  1785  1976  712  766  716  767 
Business services  -618  -47  -1801  -462  -514  120  -458  149 
Other services  -206  -132  -567  -367  -200  -110  -332  -261 
Note: In scenario ‘25%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 25%; in 
scenario ‘50%’ trade barriers to cross-border services trade in the EU are cut in all services sectors by 50%; in scenario 
‘OECD1’ trade barriers to services trade are cut in all services sectors by each EU member proportionate to its product market 
regulation index as measured by the OECD; scenario ‘OECD2’ assumes equal cuts as ‘OECD1’ except that sensitive sectors 
(UTI and OSR) are not liberalized; SR denotes the short run, LR the long run. 
 
Finally, we compare the long-run results for Austria to other countries across sectors in the 
50% scenario (see Tables 12 to 14, see Appendix Table A1 for the description of sector 
codes). We selected this scenario because deeper and more protracted trade liberalization 
is more likely to reveal in what sectors countries tend to specialize.  
 
Table 12 
Changes in exports value resulting from 50%-LR scenario, % 
  AUT  DEU  FRA  GBR  ITA  NLD  REU15  EU12  CHE  JPN  CAN  USA  ROW 
PRI  -1.0  -0.4  1.0  1.6  0.0  0.9  -0.7  -2.8  1.4  2.9  0.8  1.6  1.3 
PRF  -2.3  3.7  -0.3  -1.6  -0.5  -1.4  1.3  1.2  -0.3  0.3  -0.1  0.3  0.1 
MFG  -6.6  -1.2  -0.1  -3.6  -0.3  -3.1  1.1  9.8  1.9  0.3  0.5  0.8  0.6 
UTI  41.2  51.9  37.4  28.3  24.8  28.3  37.9  51.0  -2.5  -1.1  -0.8  -1.2  -1.5 
CNS  150.0  141.6  156.6  134.2  148.4  155.3  153.8  166.8  -0.7  -0.7  -0.2  -0.5  -0.6 
TRD  39.5  50.7  41.6  36.9  44.5  44.7  41.7  46.3  -3.4  -3.2  -2.0  -2.2  -2.0 
TSP  51.1  16.0  23.7  17.9  30.8  16.5  37.5  21.6  -6.0  -2.1  -4.5  -5.1  -4.0 
CMN  148.1  156.2  100.7  117.4  138.6  199.2  141.2  133.6  -21.5  -16.3  -20.4  -20.4  -18.8 
FIN  90.4  67.6  54.3  69.7  44.2  49.5  57.4  49.7  -11.8  -9.2  -7.2  -9.1  -7.4 
INS  108.7  32.3  21.6  26.7  15.8  32.3  28.1  22.9  -8.7  -5.6  -7.2  -8.1  -6.3 
BUS  22.0  39.9  23.7  21.3  22.8  19.4  22.2  23.0  -6.0  -5.0  -5.1  -5.5  -5.1 
OSR  30.7  26.9  39.7  34.0  30.3  27.8  30.9  41.5  -0.2  0.4  1.0  0.9  0.6 
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Table 13 
Changes in imports value resulting from 50%-LR scenario, % 
viwcif  AUT  DEU  FRA  GBR  ITA  NLD  REU15  EU12  CHE  JPN  CAN  USA  ROW 
PRI  0.0  1.6  0.9  -1.2  1.6  -0.6  2.5  11.2  0.6  -0.3  0.5  0.2  0.7 
PRF  4.6  -1.7  1.2  2.0  1.5  2.4  0.2  0.8  0.0  -0.3  -0.2  -0.4  0.1 
MFG  3.4  2.7  1.1  2.1  1.4  3.2  1.5  -1.4  -0.7  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.3 
UTI  40.9  19.1  42.5  29.4  16.6  27.7  62.5  84.5  -1.1  -0.6  -0.2  -0.4  -0.1 
CNS  172.2  126.9  138.6  255.7  144.9  213.2  192.9  210.8  -1.4  -1.0  -1.2  -0.9  -0.7 
TRD  38.9  9.9  31.4  28.4  26.6  28.6  53.4  95.3  -0.1  -0.9  -1.1  -0.8  -0.6 
TSP  29.6  26.3  36.3  33.9  36.9  29.7  41.1  98.2  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.4  1.8 
CMN  25.7  51.9  337.5  131.5  4.2  50.0  110.6  231.2  3.7  1.4  2.1  1.6  1.6 
FIN  7.4  26.4  39.8  15.3  77.6  40.7  58.8  99.6  2.5  0.3  0.2  0.7  0.4 
INS  24.1  4.0  61.5  29.0  29.2  12.5  54.4  116.1  0.3  2.3  3.5  3.5  2.1 
BUS  24.5  -0.1  11.5  24.4  10.1  14.9  28.6  100.4  0.4  -0.2  -0.5  -0.4  -0.2 
OSR  40.8  17.1  28.2  21.9  30.0  34.8  58.7  79.9  -1.2  -1.7  -2.2  -2.3  -1.6 
Table 14 
Changes in trade balances resulting from 50%-LR scenario, USD million 
  AUT  DEU  FRA  GBR  ITA  NLD  REU15  EU12  CHE  JPN  CAN  USA  ROW 
PRI  -9  -185  2  544  -99  220  -1270  -1098  8  30  69  578  2329 
PRF  -419  1916  -589  -672  -422  -1148  673  34  -12  18  26  250  -115 
MFG  -8708  -31239  -4233  -14506  -5171  -7317  -3219  27729  3053  3395  2065  9105  22342 
UTI  3  852  -199  -10  10  3  -661  -1295  -38  0  -11  -11  -109 
CNS  -269  950  568  -1356  69  -1136  -2638  -737  0  16  2  15  8 
TRD  24  3778  850  991  1978  835  -4331  -2584  -152  -269  -31  -179  -1558 
TSP  2297  -2123  -2745  -3723  -1145  -1283  -2598  -11106  -480  -578  -474  -3103  -9710 
CMN  1085  3951  -8080  -804  3103  5146  2947  -1781  -361  -138  -517  -1521  -3665 
FIN  681  1569  186  13345  -267  67  -322  -618  -982  -306  -106  -2106  -1360 
INS  1976  2100  -1087  -291  -275  219  -5109  -628  -452  -106  -456  -1278  -1189 
BUS  -462  17447  2645  -1836  3045  1176  -5523  -8854  -547  -592  -693  -3611  -6072 
OSR  -367  1683  2634  1700  40  -446  -8828  -2973  43  141  209  2608  1493 
Total  -4168  698  -10048  -6618  865  -3664  -30881  -3911  82  1611  84  747  2395 
 
Overall the EU region is quite diverse in terms of trade performance, the EU12 standing 
out  as  primarily  specializing  in  manufacturing,  while  the  EU15  has  more  relative 
advantages in services. But even within the EU15 the picture is far from being uniform: for 
example, Germany is the only country in the EU to increase its processed food export after 
trade liberalization; France and the UK are the only countries to experience a decline in 
their trade balances in communication services trade. 
 
Austria shows the fastest growth in exports of transport services and is the only country 
which experiences a positive change in its trade balance in the transport sector. Austria 
also displays the highest growth of financial and insurance services exports in the region. 
This result indicates a significant potential for comparative advantages in these sectors, 
which can be realized more fully when trade is more liberalized. 17 
Austria  experiences  a  decline  in  its  trade  balance  in  construction,  business  and  other 
services trade (as does the UK), indicating that the country neither has current comparative 
advantages  in  these  sectors  nor  the  potential  to  build  up  such  advantages  (as  in  the 




5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we simulated possible trade effects of services sector trade liberalization within 
the  EU.  Despite  the  fact  that  services  trade  liberalization  has  been  on  the  agenda  for 
multilateral trade negotiations for more than ten years, the number of studies on the subject 
is still limited. This is related to underlying difficulties in defining and measuring barriers to 
trade in services. We are using here a computable general equilibrium model (GTAP model 
in the version by Francois and McDonald, 1996) augmented by econometrically derived 
estimates of barriers to services trade from Francois et al. (2007). We assume that the EU 
liberalizes trade in services, while no liberalization in the rest of the world takes place. More 
specifically we simulate four scenarios: A flat cut in barriers by 25% and 50% respectively, 
as  well  as  a  proportionate  cut  (in  proportion  to  initial  protection,  i.e.  the  most  strongly 
protected country liberalizes by 50% while other countries liberalize less in proportion to 
their initial protection level) in all sectors, and finally a proportional cut in all sectors except 
sensitive  ones  (such  as  utilities,  personal,  cultural  and  recreational  and  government 
services). We find strong similarities between the 25% scenario and both proportionate 
scenarios, while the 50% cut in trade barriers yields substantially stronger trade effects. 
 
In general, our results point towards global trade creation, and also to substantial trade 
diversion towards the liberalizing EU members. Among these, the initially most protected 
new  members,  but  also  Austria,  experience  the  largest  increases  in  services  trade. 
Savings and capital reallocations reinforce the short-run effects, yielding somewhat larger 
trade  creation  effects.  However,  we  mostly  see  a  clear  deterioration  of  overall  trade 
balances. The reasons for this negative net trade effect differ between old and new EU 
members. The largest services traders among the old EU members specialize increasingly 
in services, experiencing a decline in net manufacturing exports with consequent negative 
effects on the total trade balance. Also Austria belongs into this group. In the long run, the 
decline in manufacturing net exports becomes smaller and services exports speed up, 
resulting in a smaller deterioration of the trade balance. The remaining old member states 
also  see  a  decline  in  their  trade  balances  which,  however,  arises  from  a  worsening 
services trade balance. The new members, on the other hand, increasingly specialize in 
the  production  and  exports  of  manufactured  goods.  Despite  a  greatly  improving 
manufacturing  trade  balance,  they  remain  net  importers  in  general.  This  is  due  to  a 
worsening  services  trade  balance  while  manufacturing  trade  remains  in  deficit  for  this 
group of countries.  18 
Finally, a full liberalization scenario (including all services sectors) results in a better net 
outcome of the liberalization, while the exclusion of certain sectors can inhibit its effects on 
trade.  
 
For  Austria,  we  estimate  a  particularly  strong  increase  in  both,  services  exports  and 
imports.  Especially  communication  services,  construction  services  and  financial  and 
insurance services will grow strongly – often, but not always, because of their small initial 
value in Austria’s services trade. This points towards an unexploited potential for Austrian 
trade in these services categories. It further shows that – unlike the general trend where 
trade  liberalization  reinforces  existing  specialization  patterns  –  Austria  may  actually 
develop  new  comparative  advantages  in  some  services  sectors  in  a  more  liberal 
environment.  
 
To summarize, we find mostly a deterioration of the overall trade balance, especially also 
for the liberalizing countries. This is consistent however with the existing literature, which 
stresses that the main gains from liberalizing trade in services are not expected to come 
from increased net exports, but rather from better and cheaper services imports which can 
be  used  as  inputs  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  Hence,  in  order  to  give  a 
comprehensive picture of the effects of liberalizing services trade, a full welfare analysis is 
necessary.  Nevertheless,  our  results  reveal  interesting  effects.  While  the  old  member 
states specialize increasingly in the production of services, the new member states deepen 
their comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector within Europe. Although Austria is 
currently also highly specialized in manufacturing trade (at least this is revealed by current 
comparative advantages), it clearly belongs into the group of old member states which 
increasingly specialize on services as a result of more liberal trade in the sector. As such, 
our results are consistent with earlier findings that trade liberalization reinforces existing 
comparative advantages.  19 
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GTAP Sector codes and description 
Sector Code  Description 
PRI  primary goods 
PRF  processed food 
MFG  manufactured goods 
UTI  utilities 
CNS  construction services 
TRD  trade and repair services 
TSP  transportation services 
CMN  communication services 
FIN  financial services 
INS  insurance services 
BUS  business services 
OSR  other (personal & government) services 
 
 